For a nice history of this amendment, checkout this summary on the Federal Evidence Review blog.
In an unpublished Aug. 27, 2013, opinion, the conservative court led by presiding Judge Michael Talbot, branded the original Iron Circuit Court's failure to demand new deliberations as “plain error.” The appellate court, in its non-binding opinion, cites MCR 6.411: “[i]f an alternate juror replaces a juror after the jury retires to consider its verdict, the court shall instruct the jury to begin its deliberations anew.” Errors in jury instructions, the appellate court emphasizes, are of a constitutional magnitude. People v. Tate, 244 Mich App 553, 567; 624 NW2d 524 (2001). There actually were two deadlocked jurors in this case. Juror K was the one who, upon questioning, revealed that he was at a Christmas party several years before when he touched a young girl during a group picture. He further revealed that he was cleared of any wrongdoing and said he did not mention the incident during voir dire for two reasons: He didn’t think the past would affect his judgment and he did not want to bring attention to himself. The court removed him from the case after further learning that “he had received a lot of peer pressure in the jury room.” Once an alternate was chosen, the court ordered the jury resume deliberations instead of starting anew, and the defense counsel politely declined the judge’s invitation for comments. “Given the existence of the original two ‘holdouts,’ this was obviously a close case,” the court wrote in its opinion, “and, when viewed in light of the error discussed infra, we find that it could indeed have had an effect in the outcome of the trial if the jury had begun deliberations anew with a new member and the fresh perspective that member would bring.”
The infra error was when the court gave sway to the prosecution in its line of questioning. The appellate court cited MRE 404(a), which says the only way prosecutors can introduce evidence of a non-testifying defendant’s character is if the defendant “first opens the door” by offering evidence of that character trait. The prosecutor was questioning a female witness about Mr. Morikawa and how she came to know him. After some routine questions, the prosecutor then asked the following: “And based upon your familiarity with him and with other troopers can you come to a conclusion or an opinion as to his credibility and veracity being truthfulness? Do you have an opinion?”
A: Yes, I do.
Q: What is it?
A: He is not credible.
The prosecutor had the witness clarify that she meant “truthful” when she said “credible.” There was no objection from defense counsel. People v Morikawa, Court of Appeals No. 308016.
The sad thing is that they are so focused on winning individual cases that they have stopped thinking like institutional litigators. Everyone cleans themselves up for trial. People who never wear suits wear a suit to court. Woman wear more conservative makeup and jewelry to court. Everyone wants to put their best foot forward. Prosecutors have recently sought the right to argue this change of appearance to the jury. When the Defendant gets a haircut, upgrades his glasses, etc. prosecutors have been making the argument that they should be able to tell the jury that this isn't what the Defendant looks like. They've been winning with this argument. My question is how will they stop up from making the same argument when they do that with their complainants. I've regularly seen complainants (child and adult) dress provocatively in the real world and show up in court looking like they were regulars on the church choir. I can't wait to use the prosecutor's new doctrine against them. It should be interesting.
In United States v Adams, Sixth Circuit No. 08-5372, the Sixth Circuit reversed the Defendant’s conviction based on a corpus delecti rule. The corpus delecti rule prohibits a jury from convicting a criminal defendant on his/her confession alone. The district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that defendant’s confession must be corroborated by independent evidence. Rejecting the proposed instruction was error even though there was some evidence that tended to corroborate defendant’s confession (the gun was found in a jacket near defendant) because the jury was not ever advised that corroboration was necessary. The error was not harmless because the jury may have improperly convicted defendant on the basis of the uncorroborated statement alone.